Interculturalism, in its two forms, critiques multiculturalism. A European version emphasises cultural encounter and novelty, and is relatively apolitical except for its disavowal of the national in preference for the local and the transnational. In contrast, its Quebecan counterpart gives significance to the idea of the right of a national community to use state power to reproduce itself. Whilst the former is a recognisably cosmopolitan vision I ask if the latter represents a distinctive mode of integration. The core of the article is a textual examination of two recent publications by leading public intellectual scholars in Quebec, Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, respectively, including a lengthy discussion of the former’s concept of ‘majority precedence’. I argue that Quebecan interculturalism challenges multiculturalists to offer a positive view of ‘the majority’, which to date they have largely neglected to do, but which is possible within the conceptual and normative resources of multiculturalism.

Keywords: multiculturalism, interculturalism, the majority, Quebec, Gerard Bouchard, Charles Taylor

Introduction

Meer and Modood (2012) identified the following four ways in which (mainly European) interculturalism (IC) is alleged to contrast positively against multiculturalism (MC) in contexts of cultural diversity:

1. It is more than co-existence, more geared toward interaction and dialogue than multiculturalism.
2. It is less ‘groupist’ or more yielding of synthesis than multiculturalism.
3. It is committed to a stronger sense of the whole (Quebecan primarily).
It is critical of illiberal cultural practices (as part of the process of intercultural dialogue).

The conclusion was that these contrasts were based on misrepresenting MC and so, while IC (in both its European and Quebecan variants) could be said to offer a difference in emphasis or a revision of MC, it was not so much an alternative, but more a modification of MC.

In this paper I consider whether that argument needs to be augmented in the light of the following three Quebecan and European publications:

- Bouchard, G. (2011). What is interculturalism? McGill Law Journal, 56 (2); and

Interculturalisms

The central argument of Ted Cantle’s book is that mass migrations and urban super-diversity are inevitable in an age of globalisation. Therefore national, ethnic and communal identities will seem irrelevant, as individuals, through diverse neighbourhoods, foreign travel, work abroad, global media and online social networks, will be in constant interaction across cultural and national boundaries. These will inevitably decompose and individuals come to have and be comfortable with hybrid, fluid and multiple identities of their own and those of others (Cantle, 2012). For Cantle’s own summary, see Cantle (2012).

I do not think Cantle’s book occasions any revision of my previous views. I hope it is quite clear from the very brief summary that I have offered that Cantle’s IC is a version of cosmopolitanism, the view that people are rightly increasingly thinking of themselves as global citizens and identifying with humanity in a post-national way. As such Cantle’s IC has certain normative and sociological strengths, but does not analytically capture the full range of contemporary ethnic, religious and national identities and their legitimate claims, which are no less than that of cosmopolitans, to be politically recognised (Modood, 2012). It is not an alternative to MC, but a valuable complement to a communitarian MC and indeed to other modes of integration.

My main purpose in this article is to examine the radically different understanding of interculturalism presented by Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor. A preliminary remark is that whilst it is clear that this version of IC owes considerably, perhaps everything, to a Quebecois struggle for the rest of Canada to recognise it as a founding nation and to a refusal to be defined within the terms of Canadian multiculturalism, my interest is not in this provenance (see Weinstock, 2013). Indeed, one of the striking features of these two texts, especially Bouchard’s, is that IC is not defined in terms of its aptness in contexts of minority nationhood,
where a nation, like Quebec, is a minority within a larger state. Furthermore, while IC is presented as an alternative to and superior to Canadian MC, it is not conceptualised in terms of the relation of one nation to another (such as Quebec and Anglophone Canada). Bouchard does not mention minority national identity in his account of IC, which he says distinctively ‘concerns itself with the interests of the majority culture’ (Bouchard, 2011, p. 438), and Taylor explicitly concludes his discussion of the meaning of IC in Quebec by suggesting that it may fit majoritarian anxieties in Europe (Taylor, 2012, p. 420). My interest in IC is at this level of general applicability, regardless of its origins, though I note that this has a certain real world logic, too. If Quebec were an independent state, its government and public would presumably continue to subscribe to IC. They would not say that IC was no longer more suited to Quebec than MC just because Quebeckers had a state of their own. Quebeckan interculturalism (IC-Q) is thus about integration in relation to a national state and not in relation to a minority nation. It is, however, worth noting that while Taylor now uses ‘interculturalism’ to capture the desire of the Quebecan majority to preserve its culture, in his famous essay on MC, Quebeckers are the central illustration of the right of a minority to preserve its culture (Taylor, 1994).

Explicitly drawing on ‘authors from Quebec who have a long history of reflecting on the topic’, Bouchard (2011, p. 439) considers IC to be a model that ‘aims at integration within a single nation’, which, as a pluralist model, ‘concerns itself with the interests of the majority culture, whose desire to perpetuate and maintain itself is perfectly legitimate, as much as it does with the interests of minorities and immigrants’ (Bouchard, 2011, p. 438; my emphasis). As an aside, it is worth reflecting upon the highlighted ‘as much as’. It seems reasonable but it is not usually how egalitarian perspectives are stated. Such perspectives normally assume a starting point where one party’s interests need to be highlighted. Feminism, for example, does not normally consist of the view that men do not have legitimate interests, but rather that they are in the main already catered for, or over-catered for, or can best be met by considering the interests of women more than hitherto.

Of the various characteristics Bouchard presents of IC, I will consider only two, the two that I believe are distinctive to his version of IC: a Diversity/Duality distinction, and a majority cultural precedence, which presupposes an assumption of duality. My purpose, then, is not to summarise Bouchard’s multi-aspected position, but to bring out, explore and learn from what I think is distinctive about his IC and challenging for MC as I understand it. While Bouchard’s understanding of IC is based on a contrast with MC, and that this contrast is rooted in his understanding of the discourses and policies of Federal Canada and Quebec, nevertheless he wants to theorise at a more general level and illustrates his argument by reference to a number of countries. For example, in relation to the first point I am interested in, he holds that MC takes different forms in different countries and changes over time (and not just in one direction), but to the extent that it is MC it exists in a ‘diversity’ model. The central feature of a diversity paradigm is that ‘there is no recognition of a majority culture and, in consequence, no minorities
per se’ (Bouchard, 2011, p. 441). Bouchard sometimes refers to the inherently individualistic character of MC (Bouchard, 2011, p. 464), which for a European is very confusing as in Europe IC is the individual-friendly correction of ‘groupist’ MC (see for example Council of Europe, 2008) but that is not the issue. The key idea of Diversity is that all individuals and groups are on an equal footing. Taylor (2012, p. 418), without using the same analytical framework or vocabulary, takes the same view: ‘the ‘multi’ story decentres the traditional ethno-historical identity and refuses to put any other in its place. All such identities coexist in the society, but none is officialized’. They are both clearly thinking of federal Canadian MC as expressed by Pierre Trudeau: ‘Although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other.’ (House of Commons, 1971).

Interculturalism, by contrast, ‘as a global model for social integration … takes shape within the duality paradigm’ (Bouchard, p. 445): a recognition of ‘the majority/minorities duality … ‘an us-them divide’ (p. 443). ‘More precisely’, Bouchard (2011, p. 445) states, ‘I am referring to the anxiety that the majority culture can feel in the face of cultural minorities. Indeed, they can create a more or less acute sense of threat within the majority culture not only in terms of its rights, but also in terms of its values, traditions, language, memory and identity (not to mention its security)’.

This is an interesting contrast, but I do not think it achieves what Bouchard wants it to. Firstly, it is not clear that it adequately distinguishes different states. Bouchard believes that a number of countries have at some time or other during the past 50 years or so, partly or fully, embraced Diversity, namely they denied that there are minorities/majorities and have disavowed an official recognition of a (historical) culture: the USA, Federal Canada, Australia and Britain are explicitly mentioned. This characterisation of each of these countries can be disputed though I will not pursue that here. Note, however, that Bouchard thinks that these countries have been moving away from Diversity to Duality in recent years—exactly the opposite sense that Cantle and cosmopolitan interculturalists have of where the world is going.2

Related to this and secondly, the term ‘Diversity’ is often appropriated by certain critics of MC. Bouchard has chosen a term to characterise MC which is the term of choice of those who offer an anti-group and individualist alternative to MC (cf. Faist, 2009). Similarly, its presence in the approach known as ‘Diversity Management’ is to positively express an individualistic understanding of ‘difference’ as an alternative to MC and related egalitarian approaches (Kandola & Fullerton, 1994; Wrench & Modood, 2001), and not just in the Anglophone sphere, but also in France (Charte de la Diversite en Entreprise, 2014). So, at a minimum, Bouchard’s Diversity/Duality distinction risks cross-national misunderstandings.

Whilst my first reservation about whether any Western country has in practice ever denied the existence of a foundational or official culture in the name of MC might be countered by saying that some intellectuals and politicians have flirted with this idea; and my second point that Bouchard’s vocabulary confuses MC with
that of its critics who self-define around a concept of ‘diversity’ may be regarded as unfortunate, but not as a major objection. My third point is the one I want to press here. This is that the Diversity/Duality distinction does not distinguish IC-Q from MC at a conceptual level.

It is true that an emphasis on majority anxieties is a radically different starting point from that of MC. The latter originates in a sensitivity to the condition of minorities: with negative perceptions and treatment of minorities in the form of racist stereotypes, group labels, misrecognition, discrimination, exclusion, marginalisation and various other forms of inequality that are centred around the existence of a public space that is reflective of the culture of some citizens and not of others (Modood, 2007/2013, pp. 37–41). Nevertheless, it should be apparent from the last sentence that MC is framed within the majority–minority duality, at the very least its starting point is ‘an us–them divide’. My own way of expressing this is that MC begins with ‘the fact of negative difference … an unequal ‘us–them’ relationship’ (Modood, 2007, pp. 37–41, 2013, pp. 34–37). I begin with ‘difference’ and speak of minorities (as do all the MC positions that I know) so, once again, it is not MC but IC-European or cosmopolitanism that seems to fit ‘Diversity’ and seems to be Bouchard’s unintended target.

**Majority Precedence**

I turn now to the second of Bouchard’s (2011, p. 451) two defining ideas of IC: ‘While seeking an equitable interaction between continuity and diversity, interculturalism allows for the recognition of certain elements of ad hoc (or contextual) precedence for majority culture’. Lest there be a misunderstanding, he immediately adds: ‘I say ad hoc because it is out of the question to formalise or establish this idea as a general legal principle, which would lead to the creation of two classes of citizens’. Taylor (2012, p. 418) seems to be making the same qualified claim when he writes: ‘The ‘inter’ story starts from the reigning historical identity but sees it evolving in a process in which all citizens, of whatever identity, have a voice, and no-one’s input has a privileged status’.

So, while for some European authors intercultural dialogue and exchange are the key characteristics of IC and the best characteristics of MC (Rattansi, 2011, pp. 152, 160), these are not the key features of the IC of Bouchard and Taylor. The idea of majority precedence, I believe, is a significant difference from most accounts of MC. Moreover, it is different from classical assimilation and liberal individualism, which do not so much seek a lower status for minorities, but their gradual dissolution and the confinement of ‘difference’ to private spaces and weekends. Moreover, while Bouchard in several places contrasts his perspective with liberalism, it could be said that his ideas here are within a touching distance of at least one version of liberal nationalism, namely, that expressed very recently by Tim Soutphommaasane (2012, p. 76), which includes the claim that ‘the liberal nationalist suggests that any minority cultural identity should be subordinated to
the national identity’ and Geoff Levey (2008) has expressly argued that Australian MC as state policy has always recognised the foundational character of Anglo-Australian majority culture.

Bouchard argues that it is difficult, given that it is emphatically not to be given a legal or official status, to express what this precedence means in the abstract. Hence he gives some examples of legitimate and illegitimate precedence from the Canadian and Quebec context. I do not have the space here to consider such nationally specific examples and to do so would distract from the idea of majority precedence as such and in what way it is different to and a challenge to MC. Bouchard’s emphasis on majority precedence, while by no means the only point of interest in his complex position, is most challenging for multiculturalists, as it is fair to say that multiculturalists have not addressed the issue of the majority and do need to do so. Of course, multiculturalists have written a lot on the re-making of a national citizenship in order to make it more inclusive (Modood, 2007/2013), as that is central to MC as I understand it. It is therefore perhaps not entirely accurate to say that multiculturalists have neglected to note the normative significance of the majority *tout court*. In so far as multiculturalists distinguish between the majority culture and the public or civic culture, it is about the majority’s tendency to dominate and pass itself off as the whole of the national culture. It is assumed that a minority culture can be identified as distinct from what it needs to be included in, but much less is said about the majority culture in this respect. I confess to being guilty here. Stimulated by this sense of neglect I would like to reflect on the place of the majority in MC.4

Having admitted that multiculturalists like myself have not engaged much with the concept of ‘the majority’, I think a good way to approach Bouchard’s view on this topic and to consider what multiculturalists may learn from it, is to ask what might be the current view of the concept of the majority implicit in MC.

I think what I have said to date about minorities in relation to the majority can be summarised in terms of two ‘protectionist’ statements and two positive statements as follows:

1. Protection from racism, cultural racism and Islamophobia (not from majority culture per se).
2. There should be no insistence on assimilation, and nor should there be any hindrance against uncoercive social processes of assimilation or self-chosen assimilation; different modes of integration should be equally welcomed.
3. There should be multicultural accommodation of minorities within shared public institutions.
4. Minorities should be able to make claims on national culture and identity in their own ways and this remaking of national identity is part of multicultural citizenship and should be welcomed and encouraged by the majority.

So, while multiculturalists may need to think more about ‘the majority’, it is not the case that existing theories are *negative* about majority culture per se or even that multiculturalism is about protecting minorities from majority culture.
Let me consider what I think are the three main arguments for ‘majority precedence’. Bouchard’s distinctiveness lies not in the arguments as such, but in their deployment to support the idea of majority precedence. I accept the starting points of the arguments, but not the conclusions. The arguments show that the majority culture has a normative significance, but not normative precedence if that means the majority is able to make normative claims which minorities are not, or that there is always some prima facie presumption in favour of the majority culture.

No neutral space

Here, the idea seems to be that liberal, democratic or secular states, ‘beyond their founding principles, values, norms and laws’ ‘typically incorporate a number of contextual and historical elements’ (Bouchard, p. 453). Such states have a national identity that is not reducible to universal laws and norms or even to a legal–political framework, but also have a cultural aspect—such as a language(s), a specific history, a religion or set of religions, national memories and an official calendar, ceremonies, memorials and other symbols marked by these religions and histories, and this culture is central to what state-funded schools are required to teach. Whilst these national identities should be common to all citizens they are inevitably deeply shaped by ‘the majority culture’, parts of which sometimes may even be indistinguishable from the ‘national culture’. Liberal states may aspire to be culturally neutral, but all societies must have a symbolic-normative core which acts as an integrative mechanism, and liberal states are no exception. In short, liberal democratic states are not a neutral public space but have a cultural character in which the majority culture has a legitimate precedence.

I fully endorse the impossibility of a neutral public space, but query the implication of precedence. I can see that by the mere fact of what I might call ‘sociological privilege’, members of the majority culture will enjoy advantages of identification, access, discursive and other capabilities—in short, a certain kind of cultural capital or cultural power—over those less steeped in the majority and therefore the national culture. Yet while it does not follow that those advantages are unfair—given that there is no neutral public space, some will always have some advantages of that kind relative to others. Neither, however, does it follow that some particular normative precedence should be acknowledged by all in addition to these socio-cultural advantages. If Bouchard means that the sociological precedence, the fact of the power imbalance, the mechanisms by which the majority culture reproduces itself and incorporates minorities and manages change, is not illegitimate per se, is not necessarily illegitimate, that would be right and is a useful point to make if some multiculturalists and theorists imply that it is necessarily illegitimate. However, it is not legitimate in all instances either. In talking of national culture and citizenship we necessarily invoke a concept of equality and therefore have to formulate concepts of oppression in relation to public culture as Iris Young (1992) does, or concepts such as misrecognition as Taylor (1994) does in order to identify the ways in which minorities can have their claim to equal
dignity and equal respect ignored or compromised. Positive aspects of this equality can include the expunging of racist language and imagery from the public space or widening the register of symbolic prestige to include demeaned and marginal groups. The fact that a polity cannot be culturally contentless or neutral between all cultures does not mean that the concept of equality becomes secondary to majority precedence.

Identity preservation

This second argument for majority precedence is that ‘[i]n order for the majority group to preserve the cultural and symbolic heritage that serves as the foundation of its identity and helps to ensure its continuity, it can legitimately claim some element of contextual precedence based on its seniority or history’ (Bouchard, p. 451).

Here I query if the right to identity preservation—with which I have no quarrel—depends on ‘seniority or history’? If yes, then by definition no new minority has a right to identity preservation, which is a very extreme view, and I do not think there is anything to indicate that it is Bouchard’s view. If, however, minorities do have a right to identity preservation, then such a right does not depend on ‘seniority or history’, but upon being a group that is not harming anyone. In which case the majority does have this (qualified) right, but so do the minorities. Sometimes, there will be clashes and we will have to work out ways to handle them, but automatic precedence of one party over the other does not emerge simply because of seniority or history as there will be other considerations to take into account, such as individual rights, marginal utility, the vulnerability of a culture and some sense of fairness and even-handedness so that one argument like historical precedence does not necessarily trump all others.

Indeed, the relatively secure place of the majority, its enjoyment of ‘sociological privilege’ and cultural power to reproduce itself and wanting to extend to minorities what majorities claim for themselves is one of the origins of MC. Every group, and not just a majority, should have a prima facie right to identity preservation (as long as the rights and interest of others—groups and individuals—are taken into account, the cost is not too high and so on). Multiculturalists are mindful of how minorities can be under various pressures to assimilate and can become anxious about their identities, and so argue that minorities should be allowed to preserve, change and adapt in their own way and at their own pace. Bouchard usefully alerts us to the fact that under some conditions, which seem to be growing today, the majority may feel anxious about a sense of cultural loss, of losing control of the pace of identity change. Multiculturalists normally assume that the majority already has what the minority is seeking, but supposing it has not? Or parts of it—such as say, parts of the white working class—has not? As a matter of fact, the growing presence and empowerment of minorities, the multiculturalist project itself may be a cause for identity anxiety amongst the majority (Jones, 2011). Where this is the case multiculturalists need to show the same sensitivity to change
and identity anxiety in relation to the majority as to the minority. This may lead to some political difficulties at times, but there is not a theoretical problem as such. After all, one of the fundamental philosophical arguments for minority recognition is based on a dialogical or relational sense of identity that posits that it is not only members of minorities whose sense of self and self-worth is dependent on the perceptions and treatment by the majority, but also vice versa (Taylor, 1994, pp. 60–63). Therefore, where appropriate, emphasising mutual recognition, or as Bouchard puts it, reciprocity, and not merely minority accommodation may be a political adjustment, but is not a philosophical difficulty for multiculturalists. Multiculturalists can, therefore, acknowledge that the majority and minorities have a right to be supported through state structures and policies without conceding that the majority has an exclusive right to identity preservation or the precedence of seniority, let alone the right to suppress a minority’s right to publicly express and preserve its identity simply because that would mean the public space is less reflective of majority culture.

National culture as ‘useful and necessary’

The last argument I will examine is the suggestion that the fact of non-neutrality, which means that every liberal democratic state has a distinctive national-cultural identity, can be ‘useful and necessary’ even in a liberal democratic state. For example, it allows for the consolidation of national identity, which is at once a source of solidarity and a foundation for responsible citizen participation and social justice’ (Bouchard, p. 452). Bouchard cites a number of authors who hold this view, including several multiculturalists including myself, and also liberal nationalists such as David Miller, who is amongst those who have argued this most fully (Miller, 1995). Some of us have utilised this argument without the implication of majority precedence. The argument establishes that a national-cultural identity, because of its linkage with a national citizenship, has some political and normative significance, but is only acceptable as such if interpreted in a very liberal way, for example, if racist or intolerant aspects of the national culture are dropped. If individuals and groups have some freedom in emphasising different aspects of the national identity, which is differently and freely interpreted and allowed to change over time and through the inclusion of new groups. Again, if state-manufactured identities are not imposed on people and there is no expectation that a national identity—shared with minorities, but largely reflective of the majority—has to be everyone’s most important and cherished identity and must always trump all other identities.

In this way the national identity and its component parts, including key aspects of the majority culture, has to be made consistent with democratic values such as liberty, equality and fraternity, and can therefore in principle also be consistent with multicultural citizenship. In this formation the majority culture again does not enjoy a unique position. Minority identities such as that of Catholics or of black people, or specifically in relation to my own work, Muslim civic identities
too, participate and thereby both potentially adapt and support the shared citizenship (Modood, 2007/2013). Of course, they may do so in different ways and in the process extend and render more complex the relevant conception of national citizenship, giving it a multicultural character. I think that in principle all group identities can and should be encouraged (but not pressured) to support and adapt citizenship in this way. This is best done through dialogue or multilogue in which conceptions of citizenship and corresponding national identities are contested and reworked. Dialogue is indeed an idea central to multicultural citizenship but pace certain versions of IC, it is not thought of only in relation to micro, everyday interactions, but also in relation to controversies as for example Bhikhu Parekh (2000/2006) demonstrates in relation to The Satanic Verses Affair, where the majority has a chance to make its point, but often does so in a tone that is not conducive to dialogue or mutual learning. Parekh shows that such dialogues inevitably have a majoritarian or status quo starting point because even while wanting to express unfamiliar sensibilities and bring in new arguments minorities are primarily trying to persuade the majority that what they are seeking is not so different to what the majority at one time or another has sought for itself, and in so arguing the minority must justify itself by appealing to—even while seeking to modify—the existing ‘operative public values’ which structure public debate and what is thought to be legitimate or reasonable in that polity at the time (Parekh, 2000/2006).

These three arguments (no neutral space; identity preservation; national culture as useful and necessary) then urge multiculturalists to acknowledge not just recognition of minorities, but mutual or multilogical recognition and thereby to be sensitive to anxieties about threats to identity on the part of the majority as well as of minorities. They also remind us that the power of the majority to preserve their culture and to enshrine it within a national identity supported by the state is not necessarily illegitimate, though it does not invalidate multicultural concerns about the ways in which majorities can oppress, misrecognise and marginalise, formally and informally. These arguments that I have been discussing do not establish a majority precedence and do not form a basis on which to repudiate the multiculturalist project of remaking national citizenships so that all citizens can see themselves in the national identity and achieve a sense of belonging together. A living national identity is a work in progress, a conversation between where we are coming from and where we are going. The past is central to the sense of nationhood today, we have to be able to see it as our past, as how it has formed us, but equally we must appreciate the country we are becoming. It is a story in which the white or ethnic majority is central, but it is a developing story, and one in which new minorities too are characters and not just replicas of the majority or mere ‘add-ons’.

Given that I do not think that the priority of the majority culture in the national identity and public culture is necessarily illegitimate and Bouchard is explicit that the principle of precedence can be abused, it may well be asked how substantive are our differences? I mentioned that Bouchard draws on some of the controversies today in Quebec and Canada to illustrate what he thinks is legitimate from
illegitimate majority precedence. While I do not want to be drawn on the specifics of those cases, nevertheless, I do need to provide some examples in order to give content to my own position, and that is what I would like to do by way of concluding. The examples are taken from education.

Many liberal democratic countries have a statutory national curriculum for all state schools. That is a legitimate thing for a state to do. It is also legitimate for the nation to be the reference point for most of the curriculum rather than a region or a locality or the demographic composition of a specific school, though they too may be relevant. Yet that still leaves open the question of the content of the national curriculum. For a start the national curriculum must not be reducible to the majority culture or be synonymous with it: The national curriculum must seek to include aspects of the presence of minorities and their contribution to the ongoing development of the country. So in relation to history it would be illegitimate for it to be just what in the UK, or perhaps mainly in England, would be called ‘our island story’. A narrative of the various peoples—ancient and modern—who have come to and settled in Britain—mainly violently up to 1066 and peacefully since then, thus continually changing and shaping and being absorbed by what today we may call majority culture. It should, in the British case, include histories of how the British encountered and conquered various peoples and something about the histories of those people before and after these encounters and conquests. It should show how the history of the country was changed by the encounter and so how today we have come to have the ethnic composition that we have (as the saying goes: ‘We are over here because you were over there.’), how the national identity has become multi-stranded and has expanded and contracted over time as one-time minorities, like various waves of refugees, have become part of the nation, or as some have sought to leave the Union, such as most of the island of Ireland, and others have sought to change the terms of membership and to adjust majority–minority relations, usually in the direction of greater equality.

The national history will therefore not be simply a history of the majority, indeed it will show how compositions of the majority are themselves a feature of historical evolution. Jews, for example, were and are a minority when we conceive the majority to be Christians, but are part of the majority if we think in terms of white, black, brown, red and yellow. Moreover, each new generation does not simply add a new chapter to an ever-expanding book, but it re-thinks the whole story; new emphases, under-appreciated themes and storylines, the significance of certain actions, such as the British Empire, emerge and grow. In the absence of the mass migrations from countries like India and Jamaica, certain events of the past—such as the large contribution of Indian soldiers in the two world wars—may seem marginal, but should come to be significant in the national narrative today. While a national history will be for the most part what today’s majority thinks of as its history, it is legitimate to prescribe it alongside, indeed as part of, the national goal of producing citizens for a multicultural nation of tomorrow. It would be illegitimate if the national were simply identified as the history of the majority and the national identity is presented as less than open to and inclusive of minority citizens, and no
effort were made to revise the history syllabus so that all the citizens-to-be can see how the minorities form part of the national story.

Let me take one other school subject, religion. It is clear that in the present phase of multiculturalism debates, religion has come to occupy a central role and is the subject most associated with the controversy of multiculturalism. Most people accept a distinction between religious instruction (RI), the teaching of how to become a member of a certain faith, and religious education (RE), the learning of a variety of faith traditions and their past and current effects upon individuals and societies, upon the shaping of humanity, taught to classes comprising those of all religions and those of none. It is fairly uncontroversial in many countries that RE should be part of a national curriculum. Therefore, the main issue in relation to majority precedence is in relation to RI. Broadly speaking there are two majoritarian possibilities. We have a society where there is a majority religion and that alone is allowed as RI, and minorities may be exempt from those classes, but no alternative RI is provided. Or secondly, the majority view is that there should be no RI in state schools, as in the USA. Is it fair to impose either of these policies on minorities that do want RI?

That is certainly an appropriate subject for a national dialogue, but if after that certain minorities want RI as well as RE, then a truly national system, certainly a multicultural system, must make an effort to accommodate minority RI. In my understanding then, under both the majoritarian possibilities the minorities should have their religions instructed or worshipped within the national system. On the other hand, minorities do not have the right to stop the majority from including the instruction of their own religion. We should not, for example, ask schools to cease Christian RI, or worship, or celebrating Christmas because of the presence of Muslims or Hindus. Rather, we should extend, for example, the celebrations to include Eid and Diwali. Muslims and other religious minorities in Europe are seeking accommodation within something resembling the status quo, not a dispossession of Christian churches, and so what we are really seeing is an additive, not a subtractive view of inclusivity (Modood, 2007/2013, forthcoming 2014). The challenge is not how to de-Christianise western states, but how to appropriately add the new faiths alongside the older ones in ways that are faithful to national cultures, but also adapting them so they are inclusive in this additive sense. All the evidence suggests that this is what most minorities, especially Muslims, want, certainly in Britain (Modood, 1997). It is not the case as a political scientist (Lennard, 2010, p. 317) recently put it that ‘accommodating Muslims in the political sphere, certainly requires abandoning a commitment to the Christian norms that have, historically, defined European states’. The challenge is not how to de-Christianise states like ours, but how to appropriately add the new faiths alongside the older ones. This indeed is what is gradually happening across much of western Europe, albeit in an ad hoc and uneven way. What is interesting is that those most uncomfortable with this are not Christians or Churches, but ideological secularists.

These two examples, then, illustrate what I take to be a multiculturalist recognition of the legitimate claims and limits of majority culture. The majority may insist
that the history curriculum centre on how the majority came to be formed as a nation and a polity but they may not exclude the minorities from that story. The majority may – in addition to, not as a substitution for an RE which includes all religions – include the instruction of the majority religion(s) or the majority may choose to not have its religion(s) instructed in state schools, but it cannot impose its preference in this regard upon minorities, who must be given the option to have their religion instructed in state schools or not, independently of what the majority may decide for itself. The national, then, must ‘aspire to be more than merely the majority or merely ‘difference blind’, it must be genuinely inclusive. If IC-E is for dethroning the inherited national identity and leaving that space blank, and IC-Q is for embracing while opening up the national identity, MC is about replacing the national identity if closed, and for embracing if plural. In the national identity the majority clearly has a centrality, but it is only legitimate if we work to make the national identity a true reflection of the citizenship and so to extend ‘precedence’, not hoard it.

Notes

1. Bouchard and Taylor (2008, p. 118) state that the first record of the term ‘interculturalism’ in Quebec is in 1985, prior to which they could only find two references, a Council of Europe and a Belgian government document, both dated 1981. So it seems that ‘interculturalism’ is only about 15 years behind the emergence of ‘multiculturalism’ in the late 1960s, that it originated in Europe and was soon followed by Quebec.

2. These issues are matters of debate in Europe too, but no European country has come close to the view that there is no such thing as a national historic culture, and few MCs are demanding that they do, a position that comes closer to cosmopolitanism than multiculturalism. As a matter of fact, the same tensions exist within IC-Q, too (Maxwell et al., 2012).

3. In a private communication Bouchard has said that he thinks I am ‘making way too much of the idea of precedence’. He says that he sees it as ‘stemming from a sociological necessity … every society, in order to function and to survive, needs a strong symbolic foundation’ and his ‘point is that it should be preserved not as the culture or identity of the majority … but as a necessary social feature.’ I have re-read his article in the light of this communication and do not feel the need to make any changes to my text.

4. I appreciate that examples are necessary to understand general propositions and two detailed examples are offered below.

5. Dialogue is one of the foundational ideas of MC (Parekh, 2000, 2006; Taylor, 1994) in contrast to political and social theories which centre on logics of conflict, abstract rationality, market choices, legal mechanisms and so on. Multiculturalists have mainly thought of dialogue at the level of public discourses and political controversies, interculturalists have added the micro in terms of interpersonal cultural encounters and group dynamics at the level of youth clubs, neighbourhoods, towns and cities etc. (Meer & Modood, 2012).

6. I accept my two examples run against US practice and sensibilities, but nevertheless they are consistent with educational policy and practice in most liberal democratic states.

7. Again, I appreciate that this may read oddly to US readers. They should bear in mind that the US is not typical of how religion is treated in schools in the western democracies. For example, all states of the European Union give funding either to religious schools or for religious education in state schools.
References


